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Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has been aiming to define its identity in 
international politics and regain its great power status. Moreover, Moscow has ‘struggled to 
adjust to dramatic changes in its relative power, to strong challenges to international rule 
making’ (Allison, 2013, pp. 1–2). This has made Russian foreign policy very unstable and 
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characterized by many changes of scope and direction. Moscow’s actions in Ukraine underline, 
however, that Russian foreign policy has adopted a deeply assertive and conflictual stance 
which can be seen as the mark of its aspirations as a great power (Freedman, 2014; Sakwa 
2014). Assertiveness is here also the result of the fact that Russia has not attained an equal 
status with the West, or that Russia’s interests and worldview are yet to have shaped in a 
meaningful way the international agenda – or are not taken into account in regards to major 
international developments (Sakwa, 2013; Tsygankov, 2013; Makarychev 2014). Russia’s 
assertiveness and its engagement in the Ukraine crisis have been explored or predicted for some 
time in the literature. Moreover, in the last four years and especially since Putin came to power 
as president for the third time there has been a proliferation of books on Russian foreign policy 
(Mendras, 2014; Snetkov, 2014; White and Feklyunina, 2014; Curanovic, 2014; Lucas, 2014; 
Makarychev, 2014; Kanet and Piet, 2014; Tolstrup, 2013; Tsygankov, 2013; Freire and Kanet, 
2012; Rowe and Torjesen, 2012; Mouritzen and Wivel, 2012; Mankoff, 2011). 
This article focuses on the literature developed in the last four years on Russia’s foreign 
policy by exploring six books which can be thought to be representative for the range of topics 
and approaches found in the literature: two general books on Russian foreign policy (Gvosdev 
and Marsh, 2013; de Haas, 2011), one that focuses on security and intervention (Allison, 2013), 
another on Russia’s soft power and influence in the post-Soviet space (Sherr, 2013), and two 
other on Russia’s relationship with the West (Leichtova, 2014; Tsygankov, 2012). The choice 
for the six books also covers the diversity of standpoints found in the literature regarding a 
series of factors such as: the background of the authors, their research record, their theoretical 
standpoints, or their views towards Russia and Putin’s regime. In relation to the latter factor 
Tsygankov and Allisson tend to have the most critical attitudes regarding Russian foreign 
policy and Putin’s regime, while the others take a more neutral or slightly favourable position.   
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De Haas’ book looks at Russian foreign policy since 2000 by analyzing its theory and 
practice, and exploring various policy documents produced by the Kremlin during this period. 
The analytical approach of the book is rather undeveloped, but it does a good job in highlighting 
the evolution of the dynamics behind Russia’s security policy. His work is influenced by his 
background in the military and academia (in the Netherlands and Azerbaijan), and generally 
focuses on Russia’s military and security policy. Gvosdev and Marsh present in their book a 
comprehensive analysis of Russian foreign policy by looking at the various vectors, actors, 
mechanisms and directions which influence it. Acting more as a general book, it does not really 
approach the issue from a certain theoretical standpoint.   Both have extensive experience 
working in the academia and military institutes in the United States (US). Sherr looks in his 
book at the mechanisms through which Russia projects its hard and soft power in the post-
Soviet space and compares Moscow’s endeavours with those of the West. Power is seen in the 
book, similarly to realist accounts of international relations, to be the main driver in world 
politics. The book draws from Sherr extensive experience in researching Russian military, 
security and foreign policy both in academic and in policy oriented positions.   
Allison’s book examines the way in which Russia has interpreted the concept of 
intervention in international relations by focusing on a series of timely case studies ranging 
from the fall of the Soviet Union up until the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Allisson has extensive 
experience researching Russian foreign policy and more broadly the Eurasian region, most of 
his research drawing on the realist tradition in international relations theory. Tsygankov was 
trained as an academic in both Russia and the US, but spent most of his academic career in 
America. His research draws on constructivism and focuses on the role of identities in Russian 
foreign policy. In this sense, his book looks at Russian foreign policy through the lens of honor, 
which he defines as ‘what is a “good” and “virtuous” course of action in the international 
society vis-à-vis the relevant other’ (Tsygankov, 2012, p. 4). Leichtova’s book tries to explain 
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how Russia constructs its foreign policy towards the West – loosely defined as the European 
Union (EU) and the US. In comparison to the other authors, her track record in researching 
Russian foreign policy is much more limited. On the other hand, she is based in the Czech 
Republic and from that perspective her work can be considered representative for the way 
Russian foreign policy is perceived more broadly in post-Communist Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
The six books reviewed point to the fact that the main diving factor in Russia’s foreign 
policy since 2000 has been restoring the country’s great power status and reputation. In practice 
achieving the status of great power is equivalent to reinstating the Soviets Union’s sphere of 
influence in Eurasia, and more broadly acquiring the ability shape the current world order. 
Much of the debate in the six books is centred on the domestic and international contexts that 
allowed Putin to embark on a path towards assertiveness, and the sources of power through 
which he went about doing this. Consequently, in what follows the article highlights the way 
in which the six books analyze the sources of power together with the domestic and 
international factors that allowed Putin to become more assertive in regaining Russia’s great 
power status. Rather than analyzing comparatively the way each book approaches these 
aspects, the article focuses on the most important arguments the six books make – which can 
be considered to be representative for the broader literature. Moreover, the article finds that 
regardless of the theoretical standpoints employed the six books highlight Russia’s path 
towards more assertiveness during Putin’s three terms as president. 
 
Domestic factors: The centralization of foreign policy? 
The six books see the period of impressive domestic economic development during the first 
part of the 2000s to have been crucial to strengthening Putin’s regime. However, the books 
identify a different domestic aspect to have played a more salient role in allowing Putin to 
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embark the country on a path towards assertiveness in the international arena. More specially, 
they refer to Putin’s efforts to centralize Russian foreign policy under his rule and coagulate a 
common view among foreign policy elites. When he came to power in 2000 Putin was 
confronted with Yeltsin’s legacy of a fragmented foreign policy, characterized by the 
dysfunctional clash of interests between a series of diverging school of taught.  Gvosdev and 
Marsh, Allison, Tsygankov, pay particular attention to three main groups of elites:  liberals, 
pragmatists or moderates and nationalists. Liberals support the adoption of Western norms and 
do not favour using military force in the post-Soviet space. Pragmatists or moderate nationalists 
want Russia to be integrated in the international community, but on its own terms. They also 
argue that Russia has special responsibilities in the post-Soviet space which would legitimate 
it to act unilaterally. Nationalists see Russia at the center of a distinct Eurasian culture and 
advocate establishing through Russian dominance in its near abroad Eurasian integration.  
While the six books discuss in various degrees the group of elites that have shaped Russian 
foreign policy since the 1990s, they are not so clear on the means through which Putin sought 
to bring them together. Some of the strategies briefly mentioned in the books include:  the 
increase in the number and influence of former secret and military in Russian diplomacy 
(Leichtova, 2014, p. 65); the subjugation of Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to the 
views and goals of the President (Tsygankov, 2012); or controlling the foreign investment of 
Russia energy companies and oligarchs (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013). 
While it is clear from these studies that Putin has aimed has aimed to centralize Russian 
foreign policy and achieve a higher level of coordination, there is less agreement on extent to 
which he has been successful. For example, Tsygankov (2012) believes that Putin has been 
successful to a certain extent, as although liberals and dissenters oppose Putin more or less 
openly, they have not always criticized Russia’s foreign policy towards the post-Soviet space 
or its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Sherr (2013) argues that Putin sought to bring 
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about changes in Russia’s foreign policy establishment in order to restore the country’s former 
status of great power. According to him, under Putin the state became more centralized, making 
the discourse of the foreign policy leadership more important than the view found within the 
Russian public sphere. On the other hand, Gvosdev and Marsh argue that Putin’s’ centralization 
effort have been successful to a creation extent. He achieved this through identifying common 
threats (such as Fascism or the West encroachment on the post-Soviet space) and proposing 
ambitious initiatives like the Eurasian Union. However, they contend Russian foreign policy is 
still driven by various interests.  The lack of consensus on the success of Putin’s efforts to 
centralize foreign policy might stem from the rather limited analysis of the means that Putin 
used in this process. Little is also known about the inner workings of the foreign policy circles 
which are close to Putin. Future research should aim to interview key individuals around Putin, 
although given the Ukraine crisis and the increasing isolation of the Kremlin it is hard to think 
that this would be possible soon.  
International factors 
Interacting with the ‘West’ 
The broader literature points to Russia’s dynamics and shifting relations with the West as the 
most important external aspect that has shaped Russia’s efforts to regain the great power status. 
Tsygankov, Leichtova, or Allison also frame this as the most salient explanatory factor for the 
evolution of Russian foreign policy towards more assertiveness. However, in discussing 
Putin’s relations with West the six books share an ambiguous view of the West, rarely 
distinguishing between the EU and the US. This account draws on the Russian 
conceptualization of the West which is itself ambiguous and perceives the West as its 
significant other. In this background, Tsygankov argues that three patterns of honorable 
behavior in relations with the West can be distinguished in the evolution of Russian foreign 
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policy since 2000. Firstly, Russia has cooperated with the West through building alliances with 
it and showing commitment to its values. Secondly, it has adopted a defensive position where 
it has opted for alliances with the West made on Moscow’s own terms which are more flexible 
and less commitment oriented, whilst trying to focus on its internal development. Assertiveness 
is the third concept, whereby Russia has adopted a unilateral approach in order to promote its 
norms and values in the international arena. Putin’s first mandate was dominated by the need 
to cooperate with the West especially in terms of the War on Terror. However, his support for 
the West’s efforts after 9/11 has less to do with honor and was partly fueled by Putin’s need to 
reaffirm and safeguard Russia’s territorial integrity in the context of dissent in some of its 
predominantly Muslim areas. Due the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the increasingly hawkish voices within the Duma and the Russian army in his 
second and third, Putin constructed a more assertive foreign policy in trying to reposition 
Russia as a major international power (Tsygankov, 2012). 
On the other hand, Leichtova’s constructivist analysis finds Russian foreign policy 
discourse to be part of Putin’s utilitarian approach. She argues that Putin has used foreign 
policy discourse instrumentally in order to deceive the West’s of Russia’s real intentions.  
Russia under Putin sent mixed messages to the West, on the one hand showing willingness to 
collaborate and dialogue, while on the other showing a rather unscrupulous pragmatism in 
pursuing Russia’s national interest (Leichtova, 2014, p. 36). Her constructivist analysis allows 
her to probe deeply into Russian foreign policy discourse and highlights the way in which these 
mixed messages underline a shift during Putin’s three terms  from aspiring to the status of great 
power to asserting this status.  
De Haas’ (2011) analysis of official Russian foreign policy documents shows that in the 
last fifteen years the West has been viewed as a threat, a view which stemmed from the Russian 
tradition fear of the other. He goes on to argue that in Putin’s first term, Russia’s relations with 
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the West have been characterized by a sort of reluctant openness towards cooperation. On the 
other hand, during 2004-2008, in the background of the coloured revolutions in the post-Soviet 
space Putin felt increasingly threatened by the West’s penetration in its sphere of influence. 
Russia perceived the coloured revolutions as a battle in its strategic competition with the West, 
criticizing the former’s interventionism. This was part of Russia’s Monroe Doctrine which 
delineated a sphere of responsibility in the post-Soviet space (Allison, 2013). It sparked a 
widespread view within the Kremlin that if Russia did not embark on an assertive path, the 
West would continue its expansionist strategy in the post-Soviet space. Hence, maintaining 
Russia’s grip on the post-Soviet states became a key source of power for regaining Moscow’s 
status of great power – further discussed in the section on sources of power.    
The six books point to the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 as being a defining moment in 
Moscow’s relations with the West. It signalled Russia’s return to the world stage as a great 
power unopposed by the US, the EU or the international community as a whole. Until the 
Russian-Georgian war the West was rather complacent in thinking that its influence in the post-
Soviet space could not be thwarted by Russia’s hard power. Sherr argues that the war made 
‘risible the notion that as Russia became more prosperous, self-confident and economically 
entwined with Europe it would abandon its neo-imperial outlook and animus’ (Sherr, 2013, p. 
58). However, the six books do not analyse in detail the way the Georgian-Russian of 2008 war 
affected foreign policy decision-making in the Kremlin, or Russia’s long term strategic goals 
in the post-Soviet space. Shedding light on these aspects would require interviews with key 
elites in the Russian government, but would provide a clearer picture of the way the Russian–






Interacting with other parts of the world 
During Putin’s three terms Russia’s foreign policy did not focus to a large extent on relations 
with international actors outside the West. It primarily sought to create an alternative to the 
American world order by enlisting the support of the other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Among them China is Russia’s main non-
Western focus, being seen by the Kremlin as a source of both opportunities to enhance Russia’s 
international status, but also as a threat to Moscow’s power in Eurasia (Kaczmarski 2015). A 
second priority involved dealing with the Arab world. This has been influenced by Russia’s 
own internal issues with concerning Islamic extremism. The six books focus their attention on 
Moscow’s partnership with China and its relations with the Arab world. Gvosdev and Marsh’s 
book is the only one which contains a lengthy discussion of Russia’s approach towards a series 
of non-Western countries. 
Firstly, Russia’s relations with China have been based on mutual coexistence and have 
sometimes been shaped by the threat of external intervention in the Eurasian space. Putin has 
frequently highlighted the saliency and the high level of trust that characterizes this 
relationship. De Haaas argues that relations between China and Russia have been constantly 
developing in the last decade, China becoming one of the main vectors in Russian foreign 
policy in relations to arms and energy trade (de Haas, 2011, p. 48). On the other hand, according 
to Sherr (2013, p. 16) ‘the Russia-China relationship is not yet of strategic, let alone global 
significance’. Russia is also becoming aware of the challenge that China is mounting to 
traditional markets for its arms trade. China has been purchasing arms from Russia, copying 
them and selling them at a cheaper price. Russian-Chinese trade has also increased from 40 
billion dollars to 80 between 2009 and 2012.  Moreover, by supplying arms to the Chinese 
military Russia ‘is not only taking a strategic gamble with its own future but is also helping the 
shift in the balance of power in Asia’ (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013, p. 142). On the other hand, 
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Allison contends that Putin has sought to mobilize the support of China in the Security Council 
and in other multilateral settings in order to counter the influence of the US (Allison, 2013). 
Secondly, in the aftermath of the 2003 US intervention in Iraq one of the goals of Putin’s 
foreign policy was to portray Russia as maintaining a Muslim tradition in the context of the 
religion’s recognized status in Russia and the presence of various Muslim ethnic minorities on 
its territory (Curanovic, 2014). Putin attended and claimed at the 2003 Organization of the 
Islamic conference that Russia was a ‘Muslim Power’. Putin has also argued that Russian 
Orthodoxy is closer to Islam than Western variants of Christianity (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013, 
p. 297). Nevertheless, the toppling of various longstanding authoritarian regimes – by more or 
less Muslim movements – during the Arab Spring shook Russia’s  statist conceptions of the 
international system (Allison, 2013). the Arab spring created significant loses to the Russian 
military and defense industry which led to the breakdown of several deference contracts (of 
around 10 billion dollars). Moscow seems less willing than the US or the EU to support 
revolutionary forces that bring about new changes in the region (Dannreuther, 2015).  The six 
books point to the fact that the Arab Spring made the Kremlin fearful that protests in North 
Africa can spill over to Caucasus or other parts of Russia. This in turn reinforced the path 
towards assertiveness as a way of securitizing Russia from contagion with widespread popular 
unrest or Islamic extremism. However, none of six books provides a throughout analysis of the 
impact of Arab spring on Russia’s global and regional aspiration, or the way the North African 
revolution affected foreign policy decision-making within the Kremlin.  
 
Sources of power 
Regardless of the theoretical standpoint they employ the authors of the six books argue that 
Russia’s primary sources of power which have sustained the path towards assertiveness reside 
in Moscow’s military and nuclear capabilities, together with using its energy resources. In 
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terms of military power, De Hass finds that achieving the great power status has been equated 
in the minds of Russian policymakers with developing: ‘the capability of power projection by 
highly skilled, modern equipped, expeditionary military forces that could be deployed at short 
notice anywhere in the world’ (de Haas, 2011, p. 39). In this sense, one of Putin’s goals has 
been to convince the international and Russian public opinion to accept the international use 
of force. On the other hand, Allisson  contends that rather than aiming to shape international 
or domestic public opinion Russia has pushed within multilateral settings for a broadening the 
scope of international intervention. According to him, in the first half of the 2000s Russia 
accepted the legitimacy of the evolving character of the principle of international intervention 
based on human-focused conceptions of sovereignty. Russia acted in this way because it knew 
that any such intervention would have to be made through the United Nations Security Council 
where it has the right to veto. However, in the wake of the coloured revolutions in the post-
Soviet space Putin denounced American hegemony and intervention and showed less 
willingness to support the responsibility to protect principle (R2P) based on human factors 
(Allison, 2013, pp. 69–70). As a consequence, since the middle of the 2000s Russia’s view of 
legitimate intervention in the international arena has emphasized legality, constitutionalism and 
the protections of its citizens rather than morality (Allison, 2013, p. 12).  
The rise of energy prices from 2003 onwards coupled with the countries impressive energy 
resources has also been a salient source of power in the international arena for Putin. The books 
highlight that Putin has offered preferential energy deals for European countries or China in 
exchange for recognition of Russia’s great power status. Russia has also used energy prices as 
a political tool in order to put pressure on weaker states. This has been more evident in Russia’s 
near abroad.  Moreover, in the post-Soviet space, the six books also highlight that Putin has 
had at his disposal a wider range of sources of power besides using (the threat of) military 
intervention or energy prices in order to assert Russia hegemony in the region. For example, 
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Sherr lists a series of sources of power and strategies that are available to Russia in the region: 
it can present an uncompromising position to the states in the region by signalling that it is 
unwilling to move even an inch on certain issues; it can create the seeds of conflict between 
the states in the region and then play them against each other; or it can use extortion on corrupt 
elites in the region, whilst also sending mixed and ambiguous messages to them (Sherr, 2013). 
Gvosdev and Marsh add to this arsenal Russia’s significant social capital and prestige in the 
post-Soviet space which draws on the legacy of the Soviet Union (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013). 
On the other hand, Russia has also promoted the concept of sovereign democracy which argues 
that states should be free from external interference. However, in the post-Soviet space 
sovereign democracy has been employed as a tool to fend off Western influence, and has not 
referred to Russian interference (Sherr, 2013).  
In practice, Putin’s interests in the post-Soviet space have materialized in his third term in 
the ‘creation of a common economic space (which) is the most important event in the post-
Soviet space since the collapse of the Soviet Union’ (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013, p. 188). The 
Eurasian Union offers to the post-Soviet countries the prospect of exporting their surplus work 
force to Russia and getting a constant stream of remittances. The Eurasian Union has a 
downside in the fact that it entails creating new barriers with the outside world. The books 
reviewed here do not focus too much on how the development of the Eurasian has changed 
Russia’s foreign policy, or whether it has fuelled even more Putin’s assertive approach to 
international relations. Given the rather recent development of the Eurasian Union, research on 
its meaning for the course of Russian foreign policy or the politics of Eurasia is still in its 




Discussion and Conclusions  
This review article analyzed the main arguments found in the literature in the last four years by 
exploring six books which are taught to be representative – the books cover a wide range of 
topics in Russian foreign policy, while their authors come from various backgrounds. It 
researched the way these books presented the shift towards assertiveness since Putin became 
president in 2000 by highlighting the external and domestic factor together with the sources of 
power which shaped this process. Nevertheless, the six books do not cover all of the 
explanations present in the literature published in the last four years: such as the influence of 
far right and nationalist ideas on Russian foreign policy (White and Feklyunina, 2014; Laruelle, 
2012), the issue of religion and the development of Russian public diplomacy (Curanovic, 
2014), or Russia’s efforts to imitate the US pivot to Asia (Akaha and Vassilieva 2014). 
However, they focus on most of the key factors emphasized in the broader literature: ranging, 
for example, from Moscow’s evolving relations with the West to the development of Russian 
military and energy sectors. Moreover, regardless of the theoretical toolboxes employed by the 
authors (mainly realist and constructivist), the six books point that Russian foreign policy has 
been deeply marked by Putin’s leadership. Russia’s foreign policy has been continuously 
evolving since 2000 towards assertiveness, a process through which Putin has aimed to regain 
Russia’s lost status of great power. To that extent, this article emphasizes that Russian 
assertiveness is evident both in the way Russian foreign policy identities and discourses 
(Leichtova and Tsygankov), or Russia national, security or economic interests are constructed 
(Allison, Share, De Hass, or Gvosdev and Marsh). However, the authors also emphasize that 
the practical manifestations of Russia’s assertive foreign policy are hard to predict or evaluate 
as Putin’s leadership has been characterized by contradictory and somewhat erratic decisions.  
Most books written in the last four years are influenced by a deeply Western understanding 
of foreign policy and international relations, with very few exceptions (e.g. Tsygankov or 
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Gvosdev and Marsh’s studies). Empirical insights into decision-making in Russian foreign 
policy are brought to light through well-constructed analysis of policy documents, but very 
rarely based on data from in-depth interviews or surveys with policymakers in the Kremlin. 
The value of the books reviewed here lies in the way they chart the path towards assertiveness 
in Putin’s quest to put Russia again on the map as a great power. Moreover, the trends identified 
in Russian foreign policy by these books have remained rather constant in spite of the shift 
towards more assertiveness in Russian foreign policy during the Ukraine crisis. However, none 
of these books has accurately predicted the scale of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the 
radicalization of Putin’s approach towards Ukraine and the West. One explanation for this 
might reside in the fact that most studies on Russian foreign policy tend to assume a normative 
position either criticizing or defending Putin’s actions in the international arena. 
More work is needed in order to uncover the Ukraine crisis’ for Russia’s foreign policy 
and for Putin’s leadership– for example, through examining in depth the way Putin has 
centralized decision-making during the Ukrainian crisis by aiming to rally the country against 
the perceived threat of Fascism or the West’s encroachment in Russia’s near abroad. Even 
though Russia itself views the West in abstract terms, future research should try to disentangle 
the concept of the West and distinguish between the EU and the US. Scholars should also focus 
more attention on the broader Eurasian vector which has been a marginal point of interest in 
the literature. Putin’s current isolation in relation to the West might signal an increasing focus 
in Russian foreign policy towards China and Japan and a broadening of the Eurasian Union. 
Future research should also enquire into whether Russia’s shift towards more assertive in the 
international arena has been: a) part of a long-term strategy, or b) merely the result of constant 
adjustment to the shifting international and domestic contexts, or to the way Russia’s sources 
of power have evolved during the Putin’s leadership. The six books tend to favour the latter 
argument without making a clear case in this sense. Nevertheless, the literature seems to agree 
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that Putin has regained Russia’s great power status (or at least that he perceives it like that) to 
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